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In this presentation, I will discuss:
• Factors affecting emergence or re-emergence of threats
• A framework for considering research needs, and
• The potential role of biotechnology innovation. 
I will focus on food safety with concentration on infectious diseases. What I will talk 
about vis-à-vis food safety will be equally conceptually important in terms of animal and 
plant diseases. All three are important to food security both in terms of availability of 
foods and the ability of developing countries, in particular, to trade food in the global 
marketplace as a source of hard currency; it’s important that they have access to North 
America and Europe.
Much of what I will say in terms of research needs and potential tools will be equally 
applicable to food defense, although I will not emphasize that subject. Anything that I 
say about the emergence of a new foodborne disease is equally important in terms of the 
re-emergence of a foodborne disease. I define re-emergence as a known agent that “pops 
up” in new forms or locations, and the example I like to use is Clostridium botulinum 
because about every 0 years it goes through a rediscovery period. It originally started 
in Germany as an issue in fermented meats. Then as canning became more important 
it showed up in canned products. In the early 60s, it appeared as infant botulism, an 
infectious rather than a toxigenic agent. It has shown up in the past 0 to  years in 
adulterated cosmetics and it is now a food-defense concern. Also, we are seeing increasing 
numbers of cases of adult “infant botulism,” i.e. colonization of the intestinal tracts of 
adults where it produces toxin.  
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Emergence/Re-Emergence
Regarding emergence of a new food-safety concern, two important factors involve genetics. 
One is the pure chance of a change in a microorganism as a result of normal low-prob-
ability evolutionary events. And the second is that drivers can “push” microorganisms to 
change rapidly in potentially predictable ways. My working hypothesis is:
The emergence or re-emergence of a new food-safety concern is primarily the 
result of societal, technological or environmental changes that are primarily the 
result of human activities.
Although we cannot predict far into the future, like weather forecasting (versus climate 
change):
• We can look at current trends to anticipate events in the near term (5 to 0 
years), and
• We can establish a network for data-gathering to enable such forecasts. 
Food-borne disease is dependent on the “balance” between the biological agent, the 
consuming population, and the food. Based on my working hypothesis above, as long 
as that is stable and the dynamic balance is maintained, there should be a minimum 
emergence of disease. The problem is that there is nothing about foods, there is nothing 
about the food industry, there is nothing about consumers and there is nothing about 
microorganisms that stays the same. They are in a continuing state of dynamic flux. That 
flux is increasing, which means that the rate of emergence is increasing.
Drivers
Global Demographics
One of the drivers causing disease emergence is global demographics. The burgeoning 
population is facilitating the secondary spread of agents by increasing interpersonal 
contact. Also, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa, average age in all parts of the 
world is increasing, and, as populations age, susceptibility to infectious diseases increases. 
Furthermore, in many countries, rates of obesity are escalating along with related chronic 
diseases that increase susceptibility to infectious agents. Furthermore, birth rates are fall-
ing in much of the world, largely because parents have increased expectations of their 
children reaching adulthood. This affects the political landscape in terms of acceptable 
risk, particularly vis-à-vis infants and young children. And there are child substitutes: the 
sensitive issue of pets has important political overtones.
Global Food Industry
The food we consume comes from all over the world. Food-borne diseases that were previ-
ously limited geographically can now be disseminated widely. We have moved from what 
used to be microbiologically stable commodities to fresh products shipped via increasingly 
complex supply chains. It is possible to get to almost anywhere in the world within 48 
hours. Accordingly a new biological agent could be disseminated worldwide via people 
or products within that time.

Processing
There has been a continuing trend toward milder processing of food, which may result in 
selection of mocroorganisms with increased resistance. “What doesn’t kill you makes you 
stronger” is true for infectious agents. Also there is a perception that organically produced 
foods are safer, which may be true if the concern is over pesticide residue, but is not true 
microbiologically. And then there is a reemergence of the consumption of uncooked 
foods. This reflects the fact that we have been encouraged to eat more fresh produce and 
increasing demands mean that it is brought in from all over the world. It is transported 
in two-week segments from the tip of South America all the way to Alaska to ensure that 
fresh produce is available to us every day of the week. It used to be that  cantaloupes were 
available in New Jersey for just two weeks in the year. Now they are available year-round. 
And there’s a reemergence of consumption of raw milk and similar products. People have 
forgotten that unpasteurized milk used to be a source of tuberculosis. And since raw 
tuna, in sushi in particular, is popular and more nutritious than the cooked alternative, 
raw beef, raw liver and raw chicken are also being eaten as sushi, particularly in Japan, 
with several attendant outbreaks of foodborne disease. Japanese public-health officials 
are trying to convince the public to quit eating raw chicken. 
Bacterial Gene Transfer
The importance of horizontal gene transfer between bacteria cannot be overstated. E. coli 
provides a good example. In the 80s, it was thought to be non-pathogenic, whereas 
new strains continue to emerge through gene transfer causing various kinds of foodborne 
disease (Figure .).
Figure . Importance of horizontal gene transfer—Escherichia coli.
(EHEC = enterohemorrhagic E. coli)
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Research Needs
Breaking the Disease Cycle
What knowledge and tools do we need to do the following three things?
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• Anticipate and prevent the emergence of diseases from new, infectious agents. 
Although this is potentially the most cost-efficient approach, it is conceptually 
the hardest and it is difficult to obtain funding to look at something that hasn’t 
happened yet. On the other hand, it is encouraging to see an RFA for this kind of 
work within the USDA Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI).
• Eliminate or contain the emergence of diseases before they become established. 
This can be achieved only within a short time window because many agents are 
hard to get rid of once they are established.
• Eradicate emerging pathogens that have become fully established in a new niche. 
This is particularly difficult with organisms that have multiple reservoirs and 
vehicles.
Anticipating/Preventing Emergence
In anticipating and preventing, a basis is needed for selecting the microorganisms that 
are most likely to be involved, to avoid investment of funds in an organism or group of 
organisms that is of low risk or has little impact. There is need to know what portion of 
the population and what foods or food technologies are likely to be involved. And, with 
this approach, it is necessary to have the technologies and strategies available to intervene 
in the riskiest situations.
As an example, during the past ten years, Cronobacter sakazakii has emerged as a food-
borne pathogen in neonates. Although there are multiple sources for this organism, a 
furor arose because it was associated with powdered infant formula. We now know that a 
variety of other Enterobacteriaceae are occasionally associated with this type of infection, 
causing bacteremia, meningitis and necrotizing colitis, again in neonates. We also know 
that neonates aren’t the only ones consuming powdered formulas. The biggest growth 
market in powdered formulas is actually at the other end of the age scale; they are being 
recommended increasingly as nutritional supplements for seniors and geriatric patients. 
It’s noteworthy that seniors constitute the most rapidly growing segment of the popula-
tion in the United States with susceptibilities similar to those of neonates. Their immune 
systems are starting to decrease, and, through achlorhydria, they produce less gastric acid, 
begging the question, “Should we be monitoring assisted-living centers for incidences of 
infections from Enterobacteriaceae?”
Eliminating/Containing Emergence
To eliminate or contain emergence of a disease before it becomes established, rapid 
identification of the new agent and cases is needed, as is identification of vectors, vehicles 
and reservoirs to determine its origin and how it is infecting humans. Also needed is an 
effective means of quarantining the emerging pathogen. However, “quarantine” raises 
hackles because of the days when immigrants were sent to Roosevelt Island for six months 
to two years if they had symptoms of tuberculosis. And an effective means of eliminat-
ing the pathogen from localized agricultural and environmental sources is necessary. 
Finally, an effective means for removing conditions that are fostering emergence must 
be developed.
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Probably the best example is severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) caused recently 
by a coronavirus. It is noteworthy that SARS is now identified as a foodborne pathogen 
that is transmitted person-to-person. This respiratory agent is closely related to a virus 
found in civet cats and other animals in Chinese live markets. It appears that bats were the 
original source of the virus, particularly the Chinese horseshoe bat that then infected civet 
cats that also inhabit tree canopies. In the civet, an intermediate host for the virus, a muta-
tion occurred that extended host range to humans who readily transfer it by respiratory 
means. Massive international efforts by a number of governments and intergovernmental 
agencies resulted in total control. It involved a massive quarantine whereby people with 
symptoms were barred from international travel. Live-animal markets in China were 
closed. Parts of hospitals in Canada were quarantined, preventing people from entering 
or leaving. Sources and intermediate hosts were rapidly identified and intermediate hosts 
were removed to break the infection chain; civets are no longer available for purchase 
in China. Evidence indicates that the problem resulted from a loss of habitat for bats 
outside of China, forcing their migration into China and infection of local bats, which, 
in turn, infected the civet cats. 
Eradicating an Established Pathogen
To eradicate a fully emerged pathogen and its ability to cause disease, understanding of 
the following factors is needed:
• The etiology of the disease
• The ecology of the organism
• Mode of dissemination of virulence factors
• How to decrease human susceptibility
• Whether alternative food production, processing, marketing and consumption 
tools are available
• Means of effective communication to convince people of the need to change their 
ways, and
• Mobilization of political will and funding.
Such projects typically cost hundreds of millions of dollars. How much money was spent 
to eradicate small pox?
To date, no established foodborne disease has been completely eradicated. The closest 
is the poliovirus, which has not been fully eradicated. Others are in a state of control, but 
can reemerge if controls are ignored or are circumvented. Two that immediately come to 
mind are brucellosis and tuberculosis. The latter is particularly troubling because of the 
emergence of antibiotic-resistant strains. It is extremely difficult—and may be impos-
sible—to eradicate pathogens that are free-living or have multiple hosts.
Research Needs
Basically there are two types of research needs. Short-term acute needs and longer-term 
needs.
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Acute
With a new emergence, the need is to assemble an international research team immedi-
ately. Application of significant resources is needed; international establishment has to 
be prevented in less than a month.
Longer Term
Longer term needs include informatics to rapidly identify emergence events, rapid means 
for detecting and characterizing new pathogens, proactive approaches to predict where 
and when emergences are likely, and technologies for preventing them. Although difficult, 
unintended-consequence analyses should be done—by broad groups of knowledgeable 
people—to think through and quantify likely outcomes from changes in technology, 
marketing, etc.
Biotechnology’s Role
Any discussion of emerging pathogens must include enterohemorrhagic E. coli strain 
O04:H4, the cause of the outbreak of foodborne disease in German in May 0, which 
demonstrated the potential contributions of rapid, advanced biotechnology. The fact that 
the genome was sequenced within a week was amazing. On the other hand, having that 
information and making sense of it are not the same thing. I still haven’t figured out how 
an organism that has no known attachment factor actually caused disease. None of the 
press releases that I saw provided insight into why it became a pathogen. Even the most 
advanced tools will be ineffective if the basic incident-command system is flawed.
Stopping Promiscuity
Infections by E. coli O5 in the United States and around the world have decreased 
dramatically in recent years. The problem is, infections by other enterohemorrhagic strains 
of E. coli (e.g. O04:H4) are likely to continue as long as E. coli exists and is capable of 
horizontal transfer of genes. O04 is not a new emergence; it’s an extension of O5 
because of the gene-transfer process. Whether gene-transfer can be stopped is hard to 
say. Certainly total elimination of E. coli from the food supply is virtually impossible. 
Taking a serotype approach has been successful here in the United States in the short 
run. However, it’s becoming clear that it will not be successful in the long run, and so a 
new approach is needed. 
What conditions foster promiscuity in food production and processing, and in specific 
animals, etc.? Are technologies or conditions available, or can evolutionary pressures be 
brought to bear, to suppress horizontal gene transfer? Is it possible to predict which strains 
are most likely to become the next source of foodborne enterohemorrhagic infection? E. 
coli O04 was not seen as a threat until it emerged; public policies were focused on six 
other serotypes.
Overcoming Diversity
Some pathogens, like Salmonella enterica—the leading cause of foodborne disease in the 
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United States—thrive because there are so many serotypes. With over ,400 serotypes, 
no effective vaccines exist. Effective immunity would require both humoral and mucosal 
responses, but no common antigen is currently available. Compounding this, a high 
percentage of carriers are asymptomatic. About one in ten Americans carrying salmonella 
show no signs of it.
What factor do all salmonellae have in common that we can take advantage of in 
formulating new biotechnologies to prevent foodborne outbreaks? The rate of infection 
by salmonella has been constant for 0 years, although the primary vehicle has changed, 
from S. enteritidis to S. enterica. Furthermore, outbreaks of disease associated with fresh 
produce are significantly more common.
Predicting Emergence
If the number of hurricanes that will hit the United States each year can be predicted, 
why can’t foodborne-disease emergence—and what new organisms will appear—be 
predicted? Forecasting weather is based on models, a lot of data-gathering and hard-core 
computational activities. We could develop models that are based on understanding fac-
tors that influence genetic stability and on understanding the impact of environmental, 
economic and demographic factors. It will require a team effort because the simulation 
modelers don’t understand infectious diseases and infectious-disease people don’t under-
stand modeling.
Sentinel Populations
This was mentioned vis-à-vis elderly people. It provides the strongest opportunity of pre-
dicting where new emergences will occur. We need to start monitoring populations, locales 
and foods that carry inherently more risk in terms of food-born disease, for example:
• The very young, the elderly and the debilitated
• Foods that are consumed without cooking (fresh produce), and
• Areas of high population density and poor sanitary infrastructure.
Biotechnology may provide new tools to assist in this endeavor.
Long Standing Unfulfilled Needs
I have been asking for these research items for 5 years. I have put out RFAs, under-
pinned by significant funding, to try and get people to do this work and have been 
 unsuccessful.
Sample Size
Dealing with food, sample size determines method sensitivity; as the sample becomes 
smaller, assay sensitivity is lost. With a sample weight of  μg, minimum sensitivity is 
somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 organisms, providing only a 50% chance of detect-
ing the organism. Molecular biologists need training in sampling statistics. In the papers I 
review, it is common to find, in discussions of new detection systems, poor understanding 
of how to calculate lower limits of sensitivity.
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Assessing Immune Status
During an outbreak of foodborne disease, assessment of immune status of potentially 
exposed individuals is problematic. A non-invasive, rapid, field-deployable, inexpensive 
tool is needed—similar to a breathalyzer, for example—to provide a fairly accurate esti-
mate of a person’s current immune status. It would help in risk assessment to determine 
what factors need emphasis.
Concluding Remarks
We need to foster “just in time” research, particularly when responding to an emerging 
situation. We need to assemble research teams quickly, properly resourced, who under-
stand how they fit into the overall structure. The longer the time between emergence and 
control the more it will cost both in public health and in dollars. There is need to think 
in terms of “right sized” technologies. Most of our food is produced by a few companies 
and many other companies produce a small percentage of our food. In order to solve 
emerging foodborne disease problems we need to think both high tech and low tech. 
And we need to look at the world like the microorganisms we are trying to control look 
at it, to find out what makes them tick. Their basic goal is to reproduce, but I encourage 
thinking of how a microorganism—as it is getting ready to merge—actually thinks and 
that will help us figure out where it is going to pop up.
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